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THE LEARNED PROFESSION
EXEMPTION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT:
THE WRONG BRIGHT LINE?
DEBRA D. BURKE*
INTRODUCTION
A televangelist informed his followers that in a revelation God
told him that he would die unless one million dollars was raised for
his ministries by a certain date. Followers, including those on lim-
ited fixed incomes, contributed significant sums, but the total
amount given fell short of the million dollars requested. The dead-
line passed without incident, and the monies received were spent
elaborately furnishing the ministry's headquarters. A psychiatrist
engaged in sexual relations with one of her patients during the
course of treatment. The patient welcomed the overtures, con-
vinced by the doctor that this emotional and sexual involvement
would help him overcome disappointments in past relationships
and feelings of inadequacy. The tryst soured, causing the patient
to fear he could never again trust a psychotherapist. An attorney
made representations to his client which created unjustified expec-
tations for the results of the client's case, a case not taken on a
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Western Carolina University. B.A.,
M.A., J.D., University of Texas, at Austin.
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contingency fee basis. After the expenditure of substantial sums of
money in fees, the client consulted with another attorney, who ad-
vised him that the claim was groundless and that, even if the claim
had been meritorious, the Statute of Limitations barred its
pursuit.
Which of the preceding fictional scenarios most likely would
constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce, and hence be unlawful under the North Carolina statute
designed to eradicate unfair business practices? Possibly none of
the aforementioned situations would fall within the ambit of the
law. Why? The act expressly exempts professional services ren-
dered by a member of a learned profession, those professions tradi-
tionally being theology, medicine and law. This article will examine
the North Carolina statute and the soundness of this exemption.
THE ACT GENERALLY
A. History And Purpose
The North Carolina Deceptive Trade Practices Act provides
that "[U]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,
are declared unlawful."1 It is patterned after the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1938.2 Because the FTCA does not provide a
private cause of action,3 many states in the late 1960's and early
1970's enacted "little FTCA's" in order to provide statutory re-
dress for consumers who suffered damages because of unfair or de-
ceptive commercial practices.4 The legislature of North Carolina,
and those of fifteen other states, chose the language of the federal
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1988 & Supp. 1992) [hereinafter the "Act"].
2. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988) [hereinafter the "FTCA"j. Initially, the wording of
the Act did not exactly mirror the language of the federal statute. However,
North Carolina's act was amended in 1977 to incorporate the exact wording of the
federal prohibition. See infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
3. Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243, 1248-49 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978), reh'g denied,
585 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
4. See generally Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Ac-
tions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: Private Uses of FTC Juris-
prudence, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 521 (1980); Joseph Thomas Moldovan, Note,
New York Creates a Private Right of Action to Combat Consumer Fraud: Caveat
Venditor, 48 BROOK. L. REv. 509 (1982); William A. Lovett, State Deceptive
Trade Practice Legislation, 46 Tm.. L. REv. 724 (1971); Michael C. Gilleran & L.
Seth Stadfeld, Little FTC Acts Emerge in Business Litigation, 72 A.B.A. J. 58
(1986).
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prohibition,' although nearly every other state created a private
cause of action with some form of statutory prohibition against un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.6
As originally enacted, the Act announced that "[T]he purpose
of this section is to declare, and to provide civil legal means to
5. The following state acts, like that of North Carolina, are patterned after
the FTCA. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110b(a) (West 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 501.204(1) (West 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.170(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Mer-
rill 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51.1405(A) (West 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 93A, § 2 (West 1984); MoNr. CODE. ANN. § 30-14-103 (1991); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 349-A (McKinney 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(a) (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.020 (West
1989). Five other states have coupled the federal prohibition with the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-372 TO 10-1-393 (HARRI-
SON 1992); HAW. REv. STAT. §j 481A-1 to 481A-5 and §§ 480-2 to 480-24 (1985 &
Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121- , §§ 311 to 317 and §§ 261 to 271 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1992); ME. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1211 to 1216 (West 1980) and
tit. 5, §§ 205-A to 214 (1989 & Supp. 1992); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 87-301 to 87-306
and §§ 59-1602 to 59-1623 (1988). The Uniform Act basically contains a laundry
list of unfair and deceptive acts or practices which, at common law, constituted a
collection of wrongs known as "unfair competition." UNIv. DEcEirv TRADE
PRACTICES ACT §§ 1-9, 7A U.L.A. 303 (1985). See generally Richard F. Dole,
Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Trade Practices Act, 76
YALE L.J. 485 (1967). Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce
also are prohibited by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
6. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-5 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §45-50.471 (1986 &
Supp. 1992); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1522 (West 1987); ARK CODE ANN. § 4-
88-108 (Michie 1991); CAL. CiV. CODE § 1770 (West 1985); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-1-105 (West 1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904 (1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 2513(a) (1975); IDAHO CODE § 48-603 (1977 & Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §24-
5-0.5-3 (Burns 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. §50-626 (1983 & Supp. 1992); MD. COM.
LAW I CODE ANN. § 13-3-1 (1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.903 (WEST 1989);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.69 (West 1981); MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5 (1991); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 407.020(1) (Vernon 1990); Nev. Rev. STAT. §§ 598.410, 598.412,
598.413 (1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:2 (1984 & Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-3, 57-12-2(c) (Michie 1987
& Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 51-15-02 (1989); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 13.45.01(A) (Anderson 1979 & Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, § 53 (West
1987); O. REv. STAT. § 646.608 (1988); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 201-2,
201-3 (Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-13.1-1(5), 6-13.1-2 (1992); S.D. CODIPIED
LAWS ANN. § 37-24-6 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-104 (1988 & Supp. 1992);
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (West 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-4,
13-5-2.5(1)(1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-200 (Michie 1992); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-
102(v), 46A-6-104 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.18 to 100.201 (West 1988); Wyo.
STAT. § 40-12-105 (1990). Iowa apparently provides for only criminal prosecution
and no private cause of action. IOWA CODE ANN. §714.16 (West 1979 & Supp.
1992).
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maintain, ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in
business and the consuming public within this State, to the end
that good faith and fair dealings between buyers and sellers at all
levels of commerce be had in this State."' 7 Although this language
was subsequently deleted," North Carolina courts continue to reit-
erate this overriding purpose, that of establishing an effective
cause of action for aggrieved consumers, and of promoting and
maintaining ethical standards of dealings in commercial transac-
tions.9 The Act was enacted as an additional remedy, distinct from
actions sounding in tort or contract, since such actions were
deemed to be ineffective at times for aggrieved consumers.10 It is
this purpose, for which the Act was passed, which makes the ex-
press exemption for members of the learned professions even more
perplexing.11
B. Basic Requirements For A Violation
An alleged unfair or deceptive act or practice must affect com-
7. Law of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930.
8. This section was deleted when the present statute was enacted in 1977.
Law of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, § 1-2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 984 (codified as
amended at N. C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988 & Supp. 1992)).
9. See, e.g., United Virginia Bank v. Air-Lift Assoc. Inc., 79 N.C. App. 315,
319-20, 339 S.E.2d 90, 93 (1986); McDonald v. Scarboro, 91 N.C. App. 13, 18, 370
S.E.2d 680, 683, disc. rev. denied, 323 N.C. 476, 373 S.E.2d 864 (1988); Investors
Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 330 N.C. 681, 688, 413 S.E.2d 268, 271 (1992); Colvard v.
Francis, 106 N.C. App 277, 283, 416 S.E. 2d 579, 582, disc. rev. denied, 332 N.C.
146, 419 S.E.2d 570 (1992). See also Hardy v. Toler, 24 N.C. App. 625, 630-31, 211
S.E.2d 809, 813, aff'd and modified on other grounds, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d
342 (1975) (decision rendered prior to amendment deleting statutory purpose);
Jack E. Karns, Pleading Deceptive Trade Practice Claims Under the Consumer
Protection Act, N.C. ST. BA. Q.. Summer 1992, at 20, 21.
10. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543-44, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981); Ber-
nard v. Central Carolina Truck Sales, Inc., 68 N.C. App. 228, 232, 314 S.E.2d 582,
585, disc. rev. denied, 311 N.C. 751, 321 S.E.2d 126 (1984); Rucker v. Huffman, 99
N.C. App. 137, 142, 392 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1990). For example, the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act was designed to embrace conduct less culpable than that which
would be required for common law fraud. Process Components, Inc., v. Baltimore
Aircoil Co., 89 N. C. App. 649, 651-52, 366 S.E.2d 907, 910, aff'd, 323 N.C. 620,
374 S.E.2d 116 (1988); Edward B. Simmons, Note, Trade Regulation- N. C. Gen.
Stat. § 75-1.1 - Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices in the Conduct of Trade
or Commerce, 12 WAKE FOREST L. R-v. 484, 490 (1976); Jay Reeves, Vinyl Siding
Firm is Hit by Verdict for Deceptive Acts, N.C. LAw. WK.LY. Sept. 28, 1992 at 1, 4.
See also infra notes 56-57, 69-73 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 201-25 and accompanying text.
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merce before it is actionable. 2 As originally enacted in 1969,13 the
language of the Act provided that "[U]nfair methods of competi-
tion and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful."1 4 The North
Carolina Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney
Company,6 narrowly interpreted the combination of the words
"trade or commerce" so as to require an exchange of some type,
concluding that the only acts or practices forbidden by the Act
were those involved in a bargain, sale, barter, exchange, or traffic.'6
In response, the legislature amended the Act, deleted the word
trade, and substituted the phrase "in or affecting commerce" so as
to allow for a broader application of its provisions. It further lib-
erally defined commerce as including "all business activities how-
ever denominated" except for the professional services rendered by
learned professionals."8
Subsequently, the Act has been applied to a variety of activi-
ties which affect commerce.'9 The Act itself expressly exempts only
12. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 261, 266 S.E.2d 610,
620 (1980) (relationship of borrower and mortgage broker involves commercial ac-
tivities), rev'g 44 N.C. App. 210, 261 S.E.2d 135 (1979), overruled on other
grounds by Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc. 323 N.C. 559, 314
S.E.2d 385 (1988), reh'g denied, 324 N.C. 117, 377 S.E.2d 235 (1989). See gener-
ally Robert G. Byrd, Misrepresentation in North Carolina, 70 N.C. L. REv. 323,
364 (1992).
13. Law of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930.
14. Id. (Emphasis added). For an early North Carolina Supreme Court opin-
ion interpreting the legislation see Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342,
modifying in part and aff'g in part 24 N.C. App 625, 211 S.E.2d 809 (1975). See
also Simmons, supra note 10 (discussing Hardy v. Toler).
15. 292 N.C. 311, 233 S.E.2d 895 (1977), rev'g 30 N.C. App. 368, 227 S.E.2d
141 (1976).
16. Id. at 315-17, 233 S.E.2d at 898-99. See generally William B. Aycock,
North Carolina Law on Antitrust and Consumer Protection, 60 N.C. L. Rav. 207,
210 (1982).
17. Law of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, §§ 1-2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 984
(now codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 75-1.1 (1988 and Supp. 1992)).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
19. See, e.g., J. M. Westall & Co. v. Windswept View of Asheville, 97 N.C.
App. 71, 75, 387 S.E.2d 67, 69 (contractual relationship not required to affect
commerce), disc. rev. denied, 327 N.C. 139, 394 S.E.2d 175 (1990); Rucker v.
Huffman, 99 N.C. App. 137, 141, 392 S.E.2d 419, 421 (1990) (sale of home by
licensed contractor affects commerce); Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 246, 400
S.E.2d 440, 444 (1991) (sale of private residence at auction affects commerce)
rev'g 99 N.C. App. 750, 394 S.E.2d 192 (1990).
1993]
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the professional activities of members of a learned profession2 0 and
the media, with respect to the publication of misleading advertise-
ments.21 In turn, courts have refrained from implying as a matter
of law that any other activities are exempt from the definition of
commerce. The judiciary has chosen to carve only two other excep-
tions to the Act. Courts have held that the isolated sale by home-
owners of their residence did not affect commerce,22 and that
transactions in securities are to be exempt because of pervasive
regulatory schemes under state and federal law.2" Moreover, courts
have chosen to interpret the definition of commerce expansively as
embracing disputes between competitors in business as well as
those between businesses and consumers.24 It is unsettled, how-
ever, whether or not a business plaintiff must prove bad faith or
intentional fraud before coming within the purview of the Act,25 a
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(B) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(c) (1988 & Supp. 1992). The exemption for the
publishing activities of the media protects publishers from vicarious liability for
misleading advertisements innocently published. Id.
22. Rosenthal v. Perkins, 42 N.C. App. 449, 454, 257 S.E.2d 63, 67 (1979). See
also Johnson v. Beverly-Hanks Assoc., 97 N.C. App. 335, 344-45, 388 S.E.2d 584,
589 (1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 328 N.C. 202, 400
S.E.2d 38 (1991); Robertson v. Boyd, 88 N.C. App. 437, 443, 363 S.E.2d 672, 676
(1988). The supreme court has not ruled expressly upon the question of whether
or not a homeowner's exception exists under the statute, although it has assumed,
arguendo, that the exception exists. Id.; Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 245,
400 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1991), rev'g 99 N.C. App. 750, 394, S.E.2d 192 (1990).
23. See infra notes 208-209 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N. C. 247, 261-62,
266 S.E.2d 610, 620 (developer and mortgage lender), rev'g 44 N. C. App. 210, 261
S.E.2d 610 (1980); Concrete Service Corp. v. Investors Group, Inc., 79 N.C. App.
678, 340 S.E.2d 755, 760 (purchaser and supplier), cert. denied, 317 N.C. 333, 346
S.E.2d 137 (1986); McDonald v. Scarboro, 91 N.C. App. 13, 19, 370 S.E.2d 680,
684 (tortious interference with a contractual relationship), disc. rev. denied, 323
N.C. 476, 373 S.E.2d 864 (1988); United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322
N.C. 643, 665, 370 S.E.2d 375, 389 (1988) (tortious interference with covenant not
to compete). See also Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 38 N.C. App. 393,
248 S.E.2d 739 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 469 (1979); Ellis v.
Smith Broadhurst, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 180, 268 S.E.2d 271 (1980). But see Bunting
v. Perdue, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 682 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (because contract did not in-
volve a sale, plaintiff was not a consumer).
25. The supreme court has declined to address this issue in two cases which
arguably posed the question. See Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc., 319
N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578 (1987), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 81 N.C. App. 1,
344 S.E. 2d 82 (1986); Myers & Chapman v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559,
374 S.E. 2d 385, aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 89 N.C. App. 41, 365 S.E. 2d 202
(1988). For an excellent discussion of the issue and the Myers & Chapman case
228 [Vol. 15:223
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burden of proof not required of consumer plaintiffs.2 6 Neverthe-
less, the Act does apply to some business disputes, though not nec-
essarily every form of business activity, and the overall scope of
the Act remains extensive except for the learned profession
exemption.
The standard for unfairness and deception under the Act, as
interpreted and applied by the courts, is equally liberal. Plaintiffs
must establish that the act or practice which forms the basis of the
complaint is either unfair28 or deceptive.2 9 Proof of either unfair-
ness or deception is sufficient to state a violation,30 although often
courts will find that the alleged infraction was either unfair or de-
ceptive without making a specific finding as to which part of the
Act was violated.31 Because of the Act's provision for mandatory
see Dinita L. James, Note, Myers & Chapman v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc.: A Les-
son in Reading Between the Lines, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1225, 1239-44 (1989).
26. See infra notes 43-62 and accompanying text. Arguably, a distinction be-
tween consumer and business plaintiffs with respect to the burden of proof which
must be established is sound, since business plaintiffs should be more knowledge-
able about business dealings. Nevertheless, North Carolina courts seem to reject
any type of "sophisticated consumer" defense, do the distinction may not be rec-
ognized, even in light of the automatic award of treble damages under the act. See
infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. For an argument in support of the dis-
tinction see James, supra note 25, at 1243-44.
27. First Fin. Say. Bank v. American Bankers Ins., 783 F. Supp. 963, 970
(E.D.N.C. 1991) (citing Chesapeake Microfilm, Inc. v. Eastern Microfilm Sales
and Serv., Inc., 91 N.C. App. 539, 544, 372 S.E.2d 901, 904 (1988)).
28. See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
30. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 263, 266 S.E.2d 610,
621 (1980), rev'g 44 N.C. App. 210, 261 S.E.2d 135 (1979). See also Bailey v. Le
Beau, 79 N.C. App. 345, 352, 339 S.E.2d 460, 464 (1986) modified on other
grounds, 318 N.C. 411, 348 S.E.2d 524 (1986); Hageman v. Twin City Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 303, 306 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Rucker v. Huffman, 99
N.C. App. 137, 141, 392 S.E.2d 419, 421 (1990).
31. See, e.g., Bernard v. Central Carolina Truck Sales, Inc., 68 N.C. App. 228,
228-29, 314 S.E.2d 582, 583-84 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 311 N.C. 751, 321 S.E.2d
126 (1984); Eastern Roofing & Aluminum Co. v. Brock, 70 N.C. App. 431, 434, 320
S.E.2d 22, 24 (1984); McDonald v. Scarboro, 91 N.C. App. 13, 20, 370 S.E.2d 680,
684, disc. rev. denied, 323 N.C. 476, 373 S.E. 2d 864 (1988). For a discussion of
the Eastern Roofing case see Karl William Leo, Eric C. Rowe & James S. Schenck
IV, North Carolina Construction Law Survey, 21 WAKE FOREST L. Rpv. 633, 718-
20 (1986). See also Robertson v. Boyd, 88 N.C. App. 437, 363 S.E. 2d 672 (1988)
(cause of action stated for unfair or deceptive practice); Roane-Baker v. South-
eastern Hosp. Supply Corp., 99 N.C. App. 30, 392 S.E.2d 663 (1990) (tortious in-
terference with restrictive covenant constituted unfair or deceptive trade
practice).
1993]
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treble damages in the event that a violation is established,3 2 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the Act to require
that "substantial aggravating circumstances" be present before an
intentional breach of contract is deemed to be unfair or decep-
tive.33 North Carolina courts have not expressly agreed with this
interpretation 4
North Carolina courts have held that the unfair act or practice
must have an impact in the marketplace,3 5 although that impact is
not to be judged by the amount of damages recoverable.3 6 More-
over, the market impact requirement seems to be less onerous than
the public interest requirement of the Federal Tort Claims Act,37 a
requirement embraced by the deceptive trade practice legislation
of some states.3 8 For example, in McDonald v. Scarboro,39 the
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1988 & Supp. 1992). See infra notes 77-82 and
accompanying text.
33. United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 992 (4th
Cir.) ("If such an award is to be trebled, the North Carolina legislature must have
intended that substantial aggravating circumstances be present."), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1054 (1981). General United Co. v. American Honda Motor Co., 618 F.
Supp. 1452, 1455-56 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (defendant's motion for summary judgment
properly granted); Hageman v. Twin City Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 681 F. Supp.
303, 307 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Bartolomeo v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 889 F.2d 530, 535-36
(4th Cir. 1989); Cameron v. Martin Marietta Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1529, 1532
(E.D.N.C. 1990) (cause of action stated).
34. The North Carolina courts have, however, held that breach of warranty
alone will not constitute a violation of the Act. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Smith, 44 N.C. App. 685, 691, 262 S.E. 2d 646, 650, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C.
379, 267 S.E.2d 685 (1980); Stone v. Paradise Park Homes, Inc., 37 N.C. App. 97,
105-06, 245 S.E.2d 801, 807, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 653, 248 S.E.2d 257 (1978).
35. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 262-63, 266 S.E.2d
610, 621 rev'g 44 N.C. App. 210, 261 S.E.2d 135 (1980); Bernard v. Central Caro-
lina Truck Sales, Inc., 68 N.C. App. 228, 230, 314 S.E.2d 582, 584, disc. rev. de-
nied, 311 N.C. 751, S.E.2d 126 (1984); United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall,
102 N.C. App. 484, 490-91, 403 S.E.2d 104, 109, disc. rev. allowed on other
grounds, 330 N.C. 123, 409 S.E.2d 610 (1991).
36. Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary Bros. Realty, 79 N.C. App. 51, 60-61, 338
S.E.2d 918, 924, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 378, 342 S.E.2d 896 (1986).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). The federal act, unlike the North Carolina statute,
provides no means of private redress. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Since the state statute is designed to compensate individual consumers there
should be no requirement for an adverse effect on the public at large. Simmons,
supra note 10, at 488-89.
38. See, e.g., Pilch v. Hendrix, 591 P.2d 824 (Wash. App. 1979) (construing
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 19.86.010 et seq. (West 1989)); Noack Enters. v. Coun-
try Corner Interiors, 290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E.2d 347 (1986) (construing S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-5-10-560 (Law. Co-op. 1985)); Zeeman v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910 (1980)
230 [Vol. 15:223
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court recognized that the interference by one person with the busi-
ness relationship of another had a sufficient impact upon the mar-
ketplace since such conduct, taken to an extreme, could lead to a
monopolistic system and certainly failed to satisfy the statutory
purpose of promoting ethical standards in dealings.41 Since com-
merce has been so broadly defined,4 2 it is unlikely that the market
impact requirement would curtail an expansive application of the
Act.
C. Conduct Amounting To A Violation
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Phoenix
Mutual Life Insurance Company,4 substantially adopted the Fed-
eral Trade Commission's definition of unfairness as recognized by
the United States Supreme Court." The court held that a "prac-
tice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as
when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous
or substantially injurious to consumers.' 5 The Johnson court also
(construing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-370-375 (Harrison 1992)). On the other hand,
some state statutes expressly disclaim such a requirement. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 42-110g(a) (West 1992); HAw. Rsv. STAT. § 480-2(c) (1985 & Supp.
1991).
39. 91 N.C. App. 13, 370 S.E.2d 680, disc. rev. denied, 323 N.C. 476, 373
S.E.2d 864 (1988).
40. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
41. McDonald v. Scarboro, 91 N.C. App. 13, 19-20, 370 S.E.2d 680, 685, disc.
rev. denied, 323 N.C. 476, 373 S.E.2d 864 (1988).
42. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
43. 300 N.C. 247, 263, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621, rev'g 44 N.C. App. 210, 261 S.E.2d
135 (1980), modified, Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C.
559, 569, 374 S.E.2d 385, 392 (1988).
44. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). The Supreme
Court observed that:
The Commission has described the factors it considers in determining
whether a practice that is neither in violation of the antitrust laws nor
deceptive is nonetheless unfair: "(1) whether the practice, without neces-
sarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy
as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-
whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some com-
mon-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2)
whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3)
whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or
other businessman)."
Id. at 244-45, n.5.
45. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 263, 266 S.E. 2d
610, 621 (1980) (no violation found).
1993]
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acknowledged that the concept of unfairness was broader than and
included the concept of deception," and further declared that an
inequitable assertion of power or position could constitute an un-
fair act or practice.47 Therefore, unfairness can embrace a wide
range of commercial activities, 48 including using coercive tactics49
or taking advantage of an inequitable bargaining position,"0 yet un-
fairness does not include the inequitable assertion of powers, coer-
cive tactics or unfair advantage exercised by a member of the
learned professions rendering professional services.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 264, 266 S.E.2d at 622 (adopting this principle from Spiegel, Inc. v.
FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 294 (7th Cir. 1976)). See also Warfield v. Hicks, 91 N.C. App.
1, 8, 370 S.E.2d 689, 693, disc. rev. denied, 323 N.C. 629, 374 S.E.2d 602 (1988);
Forbes v. Par Ten Group, Inc., 99 N.C. App. 587, 600, 394 S.E.2d 643, 650, disc.
rev. denied, 328 N.C. 89, 402 S.E.2d 824 (1991).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (insti-
tution of frivolous lawsuit to interfere with business relationships); Rucker v.
Huffman, 99 N.C. App. 137, 392 S.E.2d 419 (1990) (misrepresentations with re-
spect to a residence); United Lab., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 370 S.E.2d
375 (1988) (interference with covenant not to compete), aff'g in part and rev'g in
part, 87 N.C. App. 296, 361 S.E.2d 292 (1987). The conduct must, however, offend
public policy or be immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially
injurious to consumers. See Spinks v. Taylor, 303 N.C. 256, 278 S.E.2d 501 (1981)
(peaceful padlocking of premises by landlord not offensive to public policy); Over-
street v. Brookland, Inc., 52 N.C. App. 441, 279 S.E.2d 1 (1981) (alleged misrepre-
sentation of future intent to impose restrictive covenants on property not
actionable).
49. See Wilder v. Squires, 68 N.C. App. 310, 315 S.E.2d 63 (wrongful refusal
to return binder to coerce the signing of a release is actionable), disc. rev. denied,
311 N.C. 769, 321 S.E.2d 158 (1984); Hoke v. Young, 89 N.C. App. 569, 366 S.E.2d
548 (1988) (no coercion exercised by insurance company's reliance on hearsay
statements of accident investigator); Love v. Keith, 95 N.C. App. 549, 383 S.E.2d
674 (1989) (wrongfully refusing to place house in Homeowners Warranty Program
in order to coerce the release of escrow funds actionable).
50. Whitman v. Forbes, 55 N.C. App. 706, 286 S.E.2d 889 (1982) (summary
judgment improper if allegations established that real estate broker purchased
house at inadequate price knowing seller was mentally incompetent). This appli-
cation of the unfairness definition is somewhat analogous to the contract defense
of unconscionability. Some states have included in their deceptive trade practices
act an express provision prohibiting unconscionable acts or practices. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE §§ 48-603C(18), 48-603C (1977 & Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-
627(a) (1983 & Supp. 1992); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 445.903(1)(x) (West 1989);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-303.01 (1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(d) (Michie 1987);
OHIo R.v. CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (ANDERSON 1979 & SupP. 1992); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 646.607 (1988); Tax. Bus. & COl CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (West 1987). UTAH
CODE ANN. § 13-11-5 (1992).
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The Johnson court also adopted the standard of deception to
which the Federal Trade Commission previously adhered, 51 that is,
a requirement only that the questionable act or practice have a
capacity or tendency to deceive.52 Both a truthful statement and
a false statement can possess the tendency or capacity to deceive53
as can a failure to disclose54 or a negligent misrepresentation.55
While proof of fraud necessarily will meet this standard, 6 decep-
tion under the Act embraces a broader range of misleading acts
which may or may not constitute fraud. 7
51. The Federal Trade Commission and federal courts prior to 1984 defined
deception as conduct which had the capacity or tendency to deceive consumers.
See e.g., Perloff v. FTC, 150 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1945); Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC,
278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960); Regina Corp.v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1963);
FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963); Trans World Accounts,
Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1979); Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106
(5th Cir. 1945); Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957). The FTC tight-
ened the standard in 1984 and now defines deception as conduct likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. In Re Cliffdale Assocs., 103
F.T.C. 110 (1984); Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. FTC, 785 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1986).
See generally Karns, supra note 9, at 20-21.
52. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 265-66, 266 S.E.2d
610, 622 (1980), modified, Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc. 323
N.C. 559, 569, 374 S.E.2d 385, 392 (1988). Accord Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C.
539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981).
53. Johnson, 300 N.C. at 266, 266 S.E.2d at 622; Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary
Bros. Realty 79 N.C. App. 51, 59, 338 S.E.2d 918, 923, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C.
378, 342 S.E.2d 896 (1986).
54. Kron Medical Corp. v. Collier Cobb & Assoc., 107 N.C.App. 331, 341, 420
S.E.2d 192, 196-97 (silence by insurance broker who owed fiduciary duty to the
insured was deceptive), disc. rev. denied, 333 N.C. 168, 424 S.E.2d 910 (1992);
Starling v. Sproles, 66 N.C. App. 653, 655-56, 311 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1984) (realtor's
failure to disclose prior offer of purchase was deceptive).
55. Powell v. Wold, 88 N.C. App. 61, 362 S.E.2d 796 (1987) (granting of de-
fendants' motion to dismiss reversed). An innocent misunderstanding, however, is
not sufficient to establish deceptive conduct. Hageman v. Twin City Chrysler-
Plymouth Inc., 681 F.Supp. 303, 307 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
56. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975). See also
Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sup., Inc., 81 N.C. App. 1, 24, 344 S.E.2d 82, 96,
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578 (1988); Powell v.
Wold, 88 N.C. App. 61, 68, 362 S.E.2d 796, 800 (1987); Webb v. Triad Appraisal,
84 N.C.App. 446, 449, 352 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1987); Budd Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire
Co., 90 N.C. App. 684, 691, 370 S.E.2d 267, 271 (1985); Canady v. Mann, 107 N.C.
App. 252, 260, 419 S.E.2d 597, 602 (1992), disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 333
N.C. 569, 424 S.E.2d 905 (1993).
57. See, e.g., Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677
(1985) (personnel agency's misrepresentations regarding investigation of back-
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Furthermore, in Marshall v. Miller,58 the North Carolina Su-
preme Court held that no showing of bad faith is required to es-
tablish either deception or unfairness, 9 and that neither the intent
of the defendant, nor the presence of good faith on the defendant's
part, was relevant. Rather, the court insisted that relevancy lay in
the effect the actor's conduct had on the consuming public.60 Nev-
ertheless, there must be a causal relationship between the alleged
ground and references of applicant), aff'g 70 N.C. App. 374, 320 S.E.2d 286
(1984); Chastain v. Wall, 78 N.C. App. 350, 337 S.E.2d 150 (1985) (misrepresenta-
tions of seller regarding ownership of certain assets), disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C.
375, 342 S.E.2d 891 (1986); Love v. Keith, 95 N.C. App. 549, 383 S.E.2d 674
(1989) (builder's misrepresentation that he was a part of the Homeowners War-
ranty Program); Davidson v. Knauff Ins. Agency, 93 N.C. App. 20, 376 S.E.2d 488
(duplicative insurance was misrepresentation that second policy had value), disc.
rev. denied, 324 N.C. 577, 381 S.E.2d 772 (1989); J.M. Westall & Co. v. Wind-
swept View of Asheville, 97 N.C. App. 71, 387 S.E.2d 67 (1990) (misleading state-
ments that contractor was bonded made to procure additional building supplies),
disc. rev. denied, 327 N.C. 139, 394 S.E.2d 175 (1990). See generally Byrd, supra
note 12.
58. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981), aff'g as modified 47 N.C. App. 530,
268 S.E.2d 97 (1980). Contra Wachovia Bank & Trust v. Smith, 44 N.C.App. 685,
691, 262 S.E.2d 646, 650 (1980) (evidence did not establish violation of the statute
absent evidence of willful deception or bad faith), disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 379,
267 S.E.2d 685 (1980). The Marshall court expressly overruled any suggestion in
Wachovia Bank and Trust that bad faith is a prerequisite to the recovery of
treble damages under the act. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 546, 276 S.E.2d
397, 401 (1981).
59. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 547, 276 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1981). For an
excellent analysis of the case see Marilyn Harmon Stout, Note, Unfair Trade
Practices-Intent Not Required To Award Treble Damages For A Violation Of
North Carolina's Unfair Or Deceptive Acts Or Practices Statute- Marshall v.
Miller, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 134 (1982).
60. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981). Accord
Wilder v. Squires, 68 N.C. App. 310, 316, 315 S.E.2d 63, 66, disc. rev. denied, 311
N.C. 769, 321 S.E.2d 158 (1984); Bolton Corp. v. T.A. Loving Co., 94 N.C. App.
392, 411, 380 S.E.2d 796, 808, disc. rev. denied, 325 N.C. 545, 385 S.E.2d 496
(1989); Leake v. Sunbelt Ltd., 93 N.C. App. 199, 204-05, 377 S.E.2d 285, 288-89,
disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 578, 381 S.E.2d 774 (1989); Ken-Mar Fin. v. Harvey, 90
N.C. App. 362, 365, 368 S.E.2d 646, 648, disc. rev. denied, 323. N.C. 365, 373
S.E.2d 545 (1988); Mosley & Mosley Bldrs., Inc. v. Landin Ltd. 97 N.C. App. 511,
517, 389 S.E.2d 576, 579 (1990); Forbes v. Par Ten Group, Inc., 99 N.C. App. 587,
601, 394 S.E.2d 643, 651 (1990), disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C. 89, 402 S.E.2d 824
(1991). Likewise, good faith is not a defense to an enforcement action by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. United States v. Beatrice Food Co., 344 F.Supp. 104 (D.
Minn. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1974); Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d
357 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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unfair act or deceptive practice and the injury suffered, 1 which, of
course, must be established as well.2
The determination of whether or not acts 6r practices meet
either the capacity or tendency to deceive standard for deception, 3
or the immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous standard for
unfairness,'" is a bifurcated process whereby the jury finds the
facts and the judge determines, given those facts, whether or not a
violation has occurred as a matter of law." Such a division checks
61. Ellis v. Smith-Broadhurst, Inc., 48 N.C.App. 180, 184, 268 S.E.2d 271,
273-74 (1980); Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 470-71,
343 S.E.2d 174, 180 (1986); Bailey v. Le Beau, 79 N.C. App. 345, 352, 339 S.E.2d
460, 464 (1986) aff'd as modified, 318 N.C. 411, 348 S.E.2d 524 (1986).
62. The plaintiff must establish that the act of unfairness or deception had
some adverse impact. See, e.g., Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc., 319
N.C. 534, 549, 356 S.E.2d 578, 587 (1987) (question of whether or not the statute
applied not reached because damages not established); Miller v. Ensley, 88 N.C.
App. 686, 691, 365 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1988) (no harm caused because contractor was
able to protect rights by lien claim); Canady v. Mann, 107 N. C. App. 252, 261,
419 S.E.2d 597, 602-03(1992), disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 333 N.C. 569, 429
S.E.2d 448 (1993) (loss of the use of specific and unique property along with its
appreciated value could constitute actual injury). Stated another way, there must
be detrimental reliance upon the unfair act or deceptive trade practice. Hageman
v. Twin City Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 681 F.Supp. 303, 308-09 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
However, such reliance need necessarily not be reasonable. Byrd, supra note 12,
at 367-369.
63. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
65. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 310, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346-47 aff'g as modi-
fied 24 N.C. App. 625, 211 S.E.2d 809 (1975). See Branch Banking & Trust Co. v.
Columbian Peanut Co., 649 F.Supp. 1116, 1121 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (asserting in good
faith a claim predicted upon an erroneous interpretation of the law is not an un-
fair act); Opsahl v. Pinehurst, Inc., 81 N.C. App. 56, 70, 344 S.E.2d 68,77 (1986)
(plaintiffs charged with knowledge of normal construction delays so missed com-
pletion date is not a violation of the act), disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 319
N.C. 222, 353 S.E.2d 400 (1987); Harris v. NCNB Nat. Bank of N.C., 85 N.C. App.
669, 677, 355 S.E.2d 838, 844 (1987) (communication from defendant's attorney to
attorney for plaintiff's employer concerning subject matter of the controversy
neither unfair nor deceptive); Hageman v. Twin City Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 681
F.Supp. 303, 309 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (breach of oral modification to written lease not
a deceptive trade practice); Hoke v. Young, 89 N.C. App. 569, 570-71, 366 S.E.2d
548, 549 (1988) (allegation of insurer's negligent reliance on hearsay statements
gathered by accident investigator failed to state a claim as a matter of law); Col-
yard v. Frances, 106 N.C. App. 277, 283-84, 416 S.E.2d 579, 582 (summary judg-
ment for defendant proper since no unfair acts or practices occurred in solicita-
tion and receipt of bids for auction), rev. denied, 332 N.C. 146, 419 S.E.2d 570
(1992). See also Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574 (1977), cert.
denied, 294 N.C. 441, 241 S.E.2d 843 (1978); Whitman v. Forbes, 55 N.C. App.
1993]
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any capricious conclusion which might be drawn by a potentially
pro-consumer jury." For this reason, and the fact the appellate
courts offer a second check on a trial court's conclusions of law,67
any fear of an arbitrary application of the Act to questionably vio-
lative conduct of learned professionals is arguably unfounded."
D. Advantages Of Bringing Suit Under The Act
There are several advantages of bringing a suit under the De-
ceptive Trade Practices Act. 9 First, a cause of action under the
Act is easier to establish than those available under the common
law. Plaintiffs in a fraud case must establish that there was a "(1)
[F]alse representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) rea-
sonably calculated to deceive, (3) made with intent to deceive, (4)
which does in fact deceive, (5) resulting in damage to the injured
party. '7 0 Such a prima facie case, then, by definition, requires
706, 286 S.E.2d 889 (1982); La Notte, Inc. v. New Way Gourmet, Inc., 83 N.C.
App. 480, 350 S.E.2d 889 (1986), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 319 N.C. 459,
354 S.E.2d 888 (1987); Medina v. Town & Country Ford, Inc., 85 N.C. App. 650,
355 S.E.2d 831, 1987, aff'd, 321 N.C. 591, 364 S.E.2d 140 (1988); Love v. Keith, 95
N.C. App. 549, 838 S.E.2d 674 (1989). Defining unfair acts or deceptive practices,
as well as defining "in or affecting commerce", are questions for the court. Chas-
tain v. Wall, 78 N.C. App. 350, 357, 337 S.E.2d 150, 154 (1985), disc. rev. denied,
316 N.C. 375, 342 S.E.2d 891 (1986).
66. See James McGee Phillips, Jr., Note, Consumer Protection -Hardy v. To-
ler: Applying the North Carolina Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation - What
Role For the Jury?, 54 N.C.L. R.v. 963 (1975-76). On the other hand, the act
might have more impact if the jury played a more significant role. Id. at 975.
67. See Ellis v. Northern Star Co., 326 N.C. 219, 388 S.E.2d 127, reh'g de-
nied, 326 N.C. 488, 392 S.E.2d 89 (1990). In Ellis the court opined that "it does
not invade the province of the jury for this Court to determine as a matter of law
on appeal that acts expressly found by the jury to have occurred and to have
proximately caused damages are unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce
under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1." Id. at 226, 388 S.E.2d at 131.
68. See infra notes 213-217 and accompanying text.
69. A party may assert other claims in addition to a violation of the Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act, such as claims for fraud or breach of contract. However,
double or triple recovery is impermissible. Marshall v. Miller, 47 N.C. App. 530,
542, 268 S.E.2d 97, 103, aff'd as modified, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981);
Wilder v. Hodges, 80 N.C. App. 333, 334, 342 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1986); Canady v.
Mann, 107 N.C. App. 252, 259, 419 S.E.2d 597, 602 (1992); disc. rev. improvi-
dently allowed, 333 N.C. 569, 429 S.E.2d 348 (1993).
70. Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 138, 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (1974). An
allegation of fraud also requires proof of reasonable reliance by the defrauded
party on the deceptive statement or omission. See, e.g., Johnson v. Phoenix Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 253, 266 S.E.2d 610, 615 (1980); Northwestern Bank v.
236 [Vol. 15:223
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proof of scienter,71 whereas proof of the statutory violation merely
requires proof of either a representation which tends to deceive or
some act of unfairness. 72 For example, statements of an intent to
perform an act when no intention exists may furnish the basis for a
cause of action for unfair and deceptive trade practices or for
fraud; however, to succeed in fraud, the plaintiff must establish
that the promissory representation was made with an intent to
deceive,73 not just a capacity to deceive. Likewise, establishing a
violation of the Act often is easier than establishing an action in
negligence, particularly since the common law defense of contribu-
tory negligence is not available under the Act.7 4 Negligence is a
fault theory of recovery; therefore the fault of the plaintiff in caus-
ing damages should be examined along with the conduct of the de-
fendant. In contrast, under the Act, "[w]hat is relevant is the effect
of the actor's conduct on the consuming public,"7 5 not fault or the
Roseman, 81 N.C. App. 228, 231-32, 344 S.E.2d 120, 123, aff'd per curiam, 319
N.C. 394, 354 S.E.2d 238 (1987); Leake v. Sunbelt Ltd. of Raleigh, 93 N.C. App.
199, 204, 377 S.E.2d 285, 288, disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 578, 381 S.E.2d 774
(1989). See generally Byrd, supra note 12, at 325-351.
71. The knowledge and intent elements together comprise scienter. Myers &
Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 568, 374 S.E.2d 385, 391,
reh'g denied, 324 N.C. 117, 377 S.E.2d 235 (1989); Forbes v. The Par Ten Group,
Inc., 99 N.C. App. 587, 594, 394 S.E.2d 643, 647 (1990), disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C.
89, 402 S.E.2d 824 (1991). While culpable ignorance alone used to satisfy the sci-
enter requirement, the Myers & Chapman case suggests that intent to deceive
must be established along with any proof that the misrepresentation was made
with knowledge of falsity or through culpable ignorance. See James, supra note
25, at 1231-32.
72. See supra notes 43-62 and accompanying text.
73. Smith v. Central Soya of Athens, Inc., 604 F.Supp. 518, 530 (E.D.N.C.
1985); Mapp v. Toyota World, Inc., 81 N.C. App. 421, 424-25, 344 S.E.2d 297, 300,
disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 283, 347 S.E.2d 464 (1986); Leake v. Sunbelt Ltd. of
Raleigh, 93 N.C. App. 199, 204-05, 377 S.E.2d 285, 288-89, disc. rev. denied, 324
N.C. 578, 381 S.E.2d 774 (1989).
74. Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 95-6, 331 S.E.2d 677,
680-81 (1985). Accord Concrete Service Corp. v. Investors Group, Inc., 79 N.C.
App. 678, 685, 340 S.E.2d 755, 760, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 333, 346 S.E.2d 137
(1986); Robertson v. Boyd, 88 N.C. App. 437, 443, 363 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1988).
Contra Libby Hill Seafood Restaurants, Inc. v. Owens, 62 N.C. App 695, 303
S.E.2d 565, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 321, 307 S.E.2d 164 (1983). In Winston
Realty Company the court noted that any statement in Libby Hill with respect to
contributory negligence being a defense to a statutory unfair or deceptive trade
practice claim was obiter dictum and expressly disavowed. Winston Realty Co.,
314 N.C. at 94, 331 S.E.2d at 680 (1985).
75. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981). See also
2371993]
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level of the plaintiff's sophistication.7
The amount of monies which can be recovered under the Act
also make it an attractive cause of action. The North Carolina Act
provides that
[I]f any person shall be injured or the business of any person,
firm or corporation shall be broken up, destroyed or injured by
reason of any act or thing done by any other person, firm or cor-
poration in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such per-
son, firm or corporation so injured shall have a right of action on
account of such injury done, and if damages are assessed in such
case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.77
Thus the Act, as interpreted, directs that damages are to be treb-
led automatically once a violation is establish ed. 8 In contrast, pu-
nitive damages for fraud or negligence are to be awarded only
when the wrong is done willfully or there are other extenuating
circumstances evidencing a reckless disregard for the plaintiff's
rights.7 19 No showing of willfulness or bad faith is necessary for an
supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. One commentator has argued that it is
the lack of such defenses which make the application of deceptive trade practice
legislation to professionals problematic and unattractive. Robert B. Hale, Com-
ment, Auditor Liability Under the DTPA: Can It Get Any Worse For Account-
ants? 44 BAYLOR L. Rav. 313 (1992).
76. Some federal courts, however, still seem to consider a type of sophisti-
cated plaintiff defense, even though any such distinction in Libby Hill was dis-
avowed in Winston Realty. See, e.g., Smith v. Central Soya of Athens, Inc., 604 F.
Supp. 518, 531 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (plaintiff was an experienced businessman); Hage-
man v. Twin City Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 681 F. Supp. 303, 307 (M.D.N.C. 1988)
(plaintiff was an intelligent, experienced businesswoman); U.S. Dev. Corp. v. Peo-
ples Fed. Say. & Loan, 873 F.2d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1989) (sophisticated real estate
developer could not possibly have been deceived). On the other hand, perhaps the
federal courts are using the plaintiff's level of sophistication to determine whether
or not a representation had the capacity to deceive or to be unfair to that plain-
tiff, as well as to ascertain whether or not there was actual reliance.
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1988).
78. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 547, 276 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1981); Atlantic
Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 715 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 848 (1983); Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary Bros. Realty, 79 N.C. App.
51, 61, 338 S.E.2d 918, 924, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 378, 342 S.E.2d 896 (1986).
79. See generally Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723, 73 S.E.2d 785
(1953); Davis v. North Carolina State Hwy. Comm., 271 N.C. 405, 156 S.E.2d 685
(1967); Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975) (outlining federal
courts' suggestion that aggravating circumstances must be present before a viola-
tion of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is found because the treble damages
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award of treble damages,80 since the Act was designed to encourage
private enforcement and to make it economically feasible to bring
a cause of action, even when the potential damages recoverable
may be limited.8' If two causes of action are established, one under
the Act, and one under the common law wherein an award of puni-
tive damages would be appropriate, the successful plaintiff must
elect to recover either punitive damages under the common law, or
treble damages under the Act.82
provision is punitive in nature). But see supra notes 32-34 and accompanying
text).
80. Only a few states allow automatic treble damages. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-1-113 (West 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2533(c) (1975); HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 480-13(a)(1) (1985 & Supp. 1987); NED. REV. STAT. § 598A.210 (1991); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 1989); TEx. (Bus. & COM.) CODE ANN § 17.50(b)(1) (West
1987 & Supp. 1993) (only first $1000.00 of actual damages automatically trebled).
Other states require that the statute be knowingly and/or willfully violated before
damages are trebled. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531 (1986 & Supp. 1992); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 51.1409 (West 1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 358-A.10 (1984 & Supp.
1992); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(a)(3) & (4)
(1988 & Supp. 1992). Still other states allow trial courts to treble damages in the
judge's discretion. ALA. CODE § 8-19-10 (1975); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133
(1991); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-9.2(a) (Supp. 1992); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 19.86.090 (West 1989). Some commentators have noted that it might be
more appropriate for North Carolina to implement discretionary treble damages
or allow a recovery of treble damages only when intent or bad faith is present. See
Paul M. Saraceni, Note, Ellis v. Northern Star Co.: Libel in a Business Setting
Subject to Mandatory Treble Damages Under North Carolina General Statutes
Sections 75-1.1 and 75-16, 69 N.C.L.REv. 1739, 1754 (1991); Stout, supra note 59,
at 146-49. Mandatory treble damages coupled with liability under the act for only
negligent acts or practices could complicate the feasibility of applying it to profes-
sional activities.
81. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 549, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403-04 (1981). Fur-
thermore, given this purpose, any credits'for amounts received from codefendants
should be deducted after the full amount of actual damages is trebled. Seafare
Corp. v. Trenor Corp., 88 N.C. App. 404, 416-17, 363 S.E.2d 643, 653, writ of
supersedeas and temporary stay denied, 321 N.C. 745, 366 S.E.2d 871, disc. rev.
denied, 322 N.C. 113, 367 S.E. 2d 917 (1988).
82. Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary Bros. Realty, 79 N.C. App. 51, 62-63, 338
S.E.2d 918, 925, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 378, 342 S.E.2d 896 (1986); Mapp v.
Toyota World, Inc., 81 N.C. App. 421, 426, 344 S.E.2d 297, 301, disc. rev. denied,
318 N.C. 283, 347 S.E.2d 464 (1986); Ellis v. Northern Star Co., 326 N.C. 219, 227,
388 S.E.2d 127, 132, reh'g denied, 326 N.C. 488, 392 S.E.2d 89 (1990). See also
Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303,. 311-12, 218 S.E.2d 342, 348 (1975) (Huskings, J.,
concurring). However, one appellate court has held that an election of punitive
damages does not preclude an award of attorneys fees under the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act. United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 102 N.C. App. 484, 493,
1993]
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Another incentive for bringing suit under the Act is that it
provides for the recovery of attorney fees,83 at the discretion of the
trial judge, providing the violation is willful.8 4 Arguably mitigating
the mandatory treble damages provision, the Act further provides
that attorney fees may be assessed against the party instituting the
action as well, if the presiding judge determines that the party
knew or should have known that the action was frivolous and mali-
cious.85 A final rationale for bringing suit under the Act lies in its
403 S.E.2d 104, 110, disc. rev. allowed as to attorneys fees, 409 S.E. 2d 610, 330
N.C. 121 (1991).
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1(1) (1988 & Supp. 1992). Attorneys fees are a
significant incentive, and to date have been generous. Reeves, supra note 10, at 4.
This proposition holds true for other state acts which allow for the recovery of
attorneys fees as well. See, e.g., Nancy Friedman Atlas, Scott J. Atlas & Raymond
T. Nimmer, DTPA in the Courts: Two Empirical Studies and a Proposal for
Change, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 609, 655 (1990).
84. Concrete Service Corp. v. Investors Group, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 678, 687-88,
340 S.E.2d 755, 761-62, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 333, 346 S.E.2d 137 (1986); Love v.
Keith 95 N.C.App. 549, 556, 383 S.E.2d 674, 678 (1989); Cotton v. Stanley, 94
N.C. App. 367, 369-70, 380 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1989). Fees may be recoverable for
post-trial motions and appeals as well. United Laboratories Inc. v. Kuykendall,
102 N.C. App. 484, 495, 403 S.E.2d 104, 111, disc. rev. allowed as to attorneys
fees, 409 S.E.2d 610, 330 N.C 123 (1991). See also Aycock, supra note 16, at 259-
60. Other states as well allow attorneys fees and/or costs to be granted in the trial
court's discretion or when the statute is knowingly and/or willfully violated. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(a) (1986 & Supp. 1992); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-
1-113(2)(b) (West 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110(g)(d) (West 1992); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2533(b) (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 106-1210(d) (Harrison 1992);
HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 481A-4(a),408-13(a) (1985 & Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121-2 § 270a(c) (Smith-Hurd 1989 & Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-
4(a) (Burns 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. §50-634(e) (1983 & Supp. 1992); Ky. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 367.220(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987); MD. COD. ANN. (Col LAW)
§ 13-408 (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-31, 325D.45 (West 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 407.025 (Vernon 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133(3) (1991); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW §349(h) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 646.638(3)
(1988); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §201-9.2(a) (Supp. 1992); TENN. CoDE ANN.
§ 47-18-109(4)(e) (1) & (2) (1988 & Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-204(B)
(Michie 1992). See generally Debra E. Wax., Annotation, Award of Attorney's
Fees in Actions Under State Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protec-
tion Acts, 35 A.L.R. 4th 12 (1985).
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1(2) (1988 & Supp. 1992). See also Marshall v.
Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 550, 276 S.E.2d 397, 404 (1981) (potential for innocent de-
fendant's award of attorneys fees is an important counterweight designed to in-
hibit the bringing of spurious lawsuits which the liberal damages provisions might
otherwise encourage).
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four year statute of limitations,8 which is more generous than
those of other causes of action. 7
THE LEARNED PROFESSION EXEMPTION
A. The Express Exemption Of The North Carolina Act
The North Carolina Deceptive Trade Practices Act embraces a
wide variety of activities which affect commerce,8 8 but expressly
excludes from the definition of commerce the professional services
rendered by a member of a learned profession. 89 This exemption
did not appear in the Act as originally enacted 0 but was added
when the Act was amended in 1977. There is no legislative history
explaining the change, which emerged from committee, although
the exemption most likely was enacted to preclude the Act's appli-
cation to professional malpractice suits.9 A party claiming to come
within the exemption bears that burden of proof, once a prima fa-
cie statutory violation otherwise has been established. 9
There are only three states which by statute expressly exempt
some services of professionals from their deceptive trade practices
acts. However, North Carolina is the only state to use this precise
86. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 75-16.2 (1988 & Supp. 1992). The statute of limitations
commences from the date the cause of action accrues, defined as when the alleged
violation occurs. U.S. v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 902-03 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
87. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(9) (1983) (three year statute for fraud);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983) (not less than three years statute for professional
malpractice). See generally Snipes v. Jackson, 69 N.C. App. 64, 70, 316 S.E.2d
657, 660, disc. rev. denied, 312 N.C. 85, 321 S.E.2d 899 (1984); Marshburn v. As-
sociated Indemnity Corp., 84 N.C. App. 365, 374-75, 353 S.E.2d 123, 128-29, disc.
rev. denied, 319 N.C. 673, 356 S.E.2d 779 (1987); Nationwide Nut. Ins. Co. v.
Winslow, 95 N.C. App. 413, 414-416, 382 S.E.2d 872, 872-73(1989).
88. See supra notes 12-27 and accompanying text.
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
90. Law of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, § 1-2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess.
91. For a discussion of the 1977 legislation and the added exemption see Su-
san Wright Mason, Comment, Trade Regulation - The North Carolina Consumer
Protection Act of 1977, 56 N.C.L. REv. 547, 552-53 (1978). See also 47 Op. N.C.
Att'y Gen. 118 (1977).
92. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 75-1.1(d) (1988 & Supp. 1992). See also State ex rel.
Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 314, 233 S.E.2d 895, 897 (1977);
Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc., 81 N.C. App. 1,. 22, 344 S.E.2d 82, 94
(1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d
578 (1987); Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 243-44, 400 S.E.2d 440, 442 (1991),
rev'g 99 N.C. App. 750, 394 S.E.2d 192 (1990) (homeowners exemption). The de-
fendant would bear that burden whether or not an implied or express exemption
was claimed.
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language in carving an exemption for professional activities from
the statutory definition of commerce. Ohio's act prohibits'unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in connection with a consumer transac-
tion,93 excluding from the definition of consumer transaction those
occurring between certified public accountants or public account-
ants, attorneys, physicians, or dentists and their clients or patients,
or those between veterinarians and their patients that pertain to
medical treatment but not ancillary services." Maryland's statute
expressly exempts the professional services of a certified public ac-
countant, architect, clergyman, professional engineer, lawyer, vet-
erinarian, insurance company authorized to do business in the
state, insurance agent or broker licensed by the chiropractor, op-
tometrist, physical therapist, podiatrist, real estate broker, associ-
ate real estate broker, or real estate salesperson, or medical or den-
tal practitioner.9 " In contrast to the North Carolina Act, these
statutes exempt specifically enumerated professional relationships
or services performed by professional practitioners. While courts in
other jurisdictions will impliedly exempt certain activities of mem-
bers of the "learned professions,"9 North Carolina is the only state
to use this specific language in the legislation itself." What is the
origin of this term and why are these members of society to be
treated differently?
B. History Of The Learned Profession Distinction
Learned professions are those "characterized by the need of
unusual learning, the existence of confidential relations, the adher-
ence to a standard of ethics higher than that of the market place,
and in a profession like that of medicine by intimate and delicate
personal ministration."98 The classic learned professions were the-
93. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §1345.02(A) (Anderson 1979 & Supp. 1992).
94. Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(A) (Anderson 1979 & Supp. 1992). See
also Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St. 3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941 (1988) (noting distinc-
tion between definition of consumer transaction under the deceptive trade prac-
tices act and the statute precluding use of a warrant of attorney to confess
judgment).
95. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-104 (1990).
96. See infra notes 114-139 and accompanying text.
97. Courts probably adhere to the "learned profession" terminology since de-
termining whether or not a professional is exempt will occur slowly, on a case by
case basis through the process of judicial inclusion. Legislatures, on the other
hand, can determine which professions should be exempt with one sweep.
98. Massachusetts v. Brown, 20 N.E.2d 478, 481 (Mass. 1939) (quoting
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ology, law, and medicine,99 although today the definition has been
extended to other occupations which require special knowledge as
opposed to special skills.10 Historically, these professions were
characterized by a spirit of public service which served the other
characteristics of the profession, organization a-Ad the pursuit of a
learned act.10 1 Dean Roscoe Pound described this spirit of public
service as motivating professionals to act even with no expectation
of reward, asserting that, while gaining a livelihood was involved in
all callings, it was incidental to a professional calling.10 2 Certainly
such a dedication is commendable, but today it is probably more
commendable than accurate.103
The significance of the learned profession distinction has its
genesis in antitrust law.1 0 The codes of conduct of certain profes-
sions seemed to sanction concerted activities, which otherwise
might constitute a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act's 105 pro-
hibition against combinations in restraint of trade or commerce.
However, in an early case, Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam
Company,106 the Supreme Court noted that a practicing profes-
sional "follows a profession and not a trade. 1 0 7 Subsequently,
McMurdo v. Getter, 10 N.E.2d 139, 142 (Mass. 1937)).
99. State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 6 (Ariz. 1961);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1210 (6th ed. 1990).
100. Aulen v. Triumph Explosive, 58. F.Supp. 4, 8 (D.C. Md. 1944); See also
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Crazy Water Co., 160 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Ct. App. 1942);
Board of Supervisor of Amherst County v. Boaz, 10 S.E.2d 498 (Va. 1940); Reich
v. City of Reading, 284 A.2d 315 (Pa. 1971). However, which occupations have
attained this distinction is unclear. See infra notes 157-200 and accompanying
text.
101. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d at 6 (quoting RoscoE POUND,
THE LAWYiR FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TmEs 6, 10 (1953)).
102. Id.
103. As U.S. Circuit Judge Craven observed, "[A]lithough the practice of law
is a learned profession, it is pursued for the purpose (among others) of earning a
living." Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 24 (4th Cir. 1974) (Craven, J.,
concurring and dissenting), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
104. For a discussion of the history of the exemption in antitrust laws see
Rousseau v. Eshleman, 519 A.2d 243, 246-48 (N.H. 1986) (Johnson, J., and Batch-
elders, J., dissenting). See also Michael J. Kaplan, Annotation, "Learned Profes-
sion" Exemption in Federal Antitrust Laws (15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.), 39 A.L.R.
FED. 774 (1978).
105.'15 U.S.C. §§ 1-78 (1988). This antitrust prohibition is also codified in
North Carolina's state law. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 75.1 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
106. 283 U.S. 643 (1931) (construing the Federal Trade Commission Act).
107. Id. at 653.
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however, the Court held that the sale of personal services, rather
than commodities, did not except the transaction from the defini-
tion of trade.108
Ultimately, the Court recognized that some concerted activi-
ties of professionals can come within the purview of federal anti-
trust laws. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Association'0 the
Court held that the activities of members of the learned profes-
sions were not per se exempt from the Sherman Act.110 In Gold-
farb, the state bar association enforced a minimum fee schedule
fixed by county bar associations through its ethical opinions, which
suggested that a deviation from the schedule might result in disci-
plinary action. The Court held that such activity violated the act
and noted that "[I]n the modern world it cannot be denied that
the activities of lawyers play an important part in commercial in-
tercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert
a restraint on commerce."'11 Later, in National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States,1 2 the Court held that the pro-
fessional canons of an engineering society, which prohibited com-
petitive bidding, violated the Sherman Act. While the Court
rejected the Society's argument that the ban was necessary to pre-
vent engineers from submitting deceptively low bids," '1 the Court
reiterated Goldfarb's recognition of the public service aspect of a
professional's practice, a characteristic which precluded viewing
that practice as being interchangeable with other business activi-
ties with respect to all antitrust concepts." 4
In diminishing some of the significance of the learned profes-
sion distinction, the Supreme Court struck down regulations
promulgated by local regulatory boards, boards which were in
charge of promoting ethical standards, as being injurious to the
public, and in violation of federal policy as established by Con-
gress. Nevertheless, whether or not state regulatory boards pre-
108. United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S.
485, 490 (1950) (members of Washington Real Estate Board violated the Sherman
Act), modifying in part and rev'g in part, 84 F.Supp. 802 (1949).
109. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Assoc., 421 U.S. 773, reh'g denied, 423
U.S. 886 (1975).
110. Id. See also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332
(1981) (physician's price fixing arrangement violated Sherman Act).
111. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Assoc., 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
112. 435 U.S. 679 (1978), aff'g 389 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
113. Id. at 696.
114. Id. at 686-87.
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empt state deceptive trade practice legislation as applied to the
learned professions, as well as whether or not a "noncommercial
activities" exemption should be recognized for the learned profes-
sions, remains an issue in state deceptive trade practices
jurisprudence.
C. The Learned Profession Distinction In Other States
In interpreting the state deceptive trade practice legislation of
other states, some courts preserve the learned profession distinc-
tion by exempting such professions based upon the existence of
self-regulatory boards.11 5 While such acts provide no express ex-
emption for learned professions, many do expressly exempt con-
duct otherwise permitted by state or federal law116 or activities au-
thorized, required, or permitted by state or federal law.11 The
New Hampshire Deceptive Trade Practices Act exempts "trade or
commerce otherwise permitted under laws administered by any
regulatory board or offices acting under statutory authority of this
state of the United States." 1 8 The New Hampshire Supreme
Court, in Rousseau v. Eshleman,' 9 fearing practical problems of
shared responsibility between regulation by the state bar associa-
115. In Goldfarb, the Supreme Court stated that "in holding that certain an-
ticompetitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman Act we in-
tend no diminution of the authority of the State to regulate its professions."
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Assoc., 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975).
116. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-II0c(a) (West 1992); IDAHO CODE
§ 41-10 (1977 & Supp. 1992); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 208(1) (West 1989 &
Supp. 1992); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 3 (West 1984); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 30-14-105 (1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:3 (1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-
12-7 (Michie 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-4 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40
(Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-24-10 (1986).
117. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-396(1) (Harrison 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 121 /2, § 270b (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-6 (Burns
1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.176 (Michie/Bobbs-Merriel 1987); MIcH. Comp.
LAWS ANN. § 445.904 (West 1989); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.12 (Anderson
1979 & Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-111 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-
11-22 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. §59.1-199 (Michie 1992); Wyo. STAT. § 40-12-110
(1990). See generally Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Scope and Exemptions of
State Deceptive Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Acts, 89 A.L.R. 3d 399
(1979 & Supp. 1990).
118. N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:3 (1984 & Supp. 1992).
119. 519 A.2d 243 (N.H. 1986), reconsideration denied, 529 A.2d 862 (N.H.
1987). In Rousseau the plaintiff claimed that the attorney misrepresented that
the mortgage on certain property would be assumable by the buyer once the prop-
erty was purchased. Id. at 863-64.
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tion and enforcement under the consumer protection act, held that
attorneys were exempt.12 0
In contrast, in Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo &
Trantolo,'21 the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the provi-
sion of legal services constituted conduct in trade or commerce
under the deceptive trade practices act."22 The Connecticut court
further held that, although attorney conduct was subject to regula-
tion by the judiciary and the bar association, there was no reason
why the disciplinary system and the deceptive trade practices leg-
islation could not co-exist.123 The court reserved, however, the
question of whether or not the Act applied to every aspect of the
practice of law.124 Connecticut's statutory exemption 125 is identical
to that of New Hampshire, although the question of whether or
not attorneys were exempt under that provision was not
presented. 2 '
Often state courts faced with such an issue will vacillate be-
tween deciding whether or not regulatory boards preempt the ap-
plication of deceptive trade practice legislation, and whether or
not, because of such regulation, the legislature intended to exempt
the noncommercial activities of learned professions from the defi-
nition of commerce. 1 7 Some state courts seem willing to apply the
legislation to the commercial activities of the learned professions,
but not to the noncommercial or professional activities. 2 8 For ex-
120. Id. at 245. See also Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163, 177 (Wash. 1984)
(Rosellini, J., dissenting) (application of consumer protection act to the practice
of law is an unconstitutional infringement upon the exclusive jurisdiction of
courts to regulate the practice).
121. 461 A.2d 938 (Conn. 1983).
122. Heslin, 461 A.2d at 941.
123. Id. at 946.
124. Id. at 943.
125. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-11OC(A)(1) (WEsT 1992).
126. Heslin, 461 A.2d at 941 (1983).
127. See, e.g., Rousseau v. Eshleman, 519 A.2d 243 (N.H. 1986) (Johnson, J.
and Batchelders, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices in Rousseau argued that
the act's exemption provision should not prevent the act's application to all activ-
ities of attorneys, but that since the challenges were directed at competence and
care in the rendition of legal services such a claim involved the actual practice of
law, and as such, was beyond the reach of the act. Rousseau, 519 A.2d at 250-51.
128. The commercial/noncommercial delineation was first drawn in Marjorie
Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Assoc. of Colleges and Secondary
School, Inc., 423 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1970); cert. denied, 400 U.S. 695 (1970)
(proscriptions of the Sherman Act were tailored for the business world and not
for the noncommercial aspects of the learned professions). Apparently the legisla-
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ample, the Washington Supreme Court, in Short v. Demopolis, 129
held that the Washington act's prohibition against unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce 30
included within its reach the entrepreneurial aspects of the prac-
tice of law, but not the actual practice of the profession.131 The
court suggested that while the business aspects of a legal practice,
such as how the price of legal services is determined, billed, and
collected and the way a law firm obtains, retains, and dismisses
clients, are properly subject to the act,13 2 claims directed to the
competence of and strategy employed by lawyers, amount to alle-
gations of negligence or malpractice and are exempt.13 3 Other ap-
pellate decisions have failed to illuminate this commercial/non-
commercial distinction in a significant way, except to suggest that
professionals who act outside their traditional role 34 or use their
position to promote the entrepreneurial aspects of a practice 35
may cross into nonexempt territory.
Illinois courts, like Washington courts, also have held that
their state act does not apply to the actual practice of law."' How-
ture of North Carolina intended to codify this distinction by only exempting pro-
fessional services rendered by a member of the learned professions. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
129. 691 P.2d 163 (Wash. 1984) (en bane).
130. WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 19.86.020 (West 1989).
131. Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163, 168 (Wash. 1984). In Short, a former
client of a law firm alleged that the firm had violated the Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act in that, while one attorney represented to the client that he would be
handling the case personally, he delegated the legal matter to a younger associate
without the client's consent. See also Jaramillo v. Morris, 750 P.2d 1301 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1988) (alleged claim against hospital for negligence in not determining
podiatrist's qualification to perform surgery does not involve the entrepreneurial
aspects of the practice of medicine and therefore is exempt). Ikuno v. Yip, 912
F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1990) (attorney's alleged failure to advise client of how lawfully
to trade commodities states a claim in tort and not under the consumer protec-
tion act). See generally Timothy L. McMahan, Note, Tolling The Death Knell
On The "Learned Profession" Immunity Under The Consumer Protection Act:
Short v. Demopolis, 21 WILLAmErE L. REv. 899 (1985).
132. Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163, 168 (Wash. 1984).
133. Id.
134. Gould v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 683 P.2d 207 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (attor-
neys acting as de facto corporate officers in representation of client could be liable
under the act).
135. Quimby v. Fine, 724 P.2d 403 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (cause of action
stated under the act if physician's failure to adequately inform patient of risks or
alternative was influenced by entrepreneurial motives).
136. See, e.g., Frahm v. Urkovich, 447 N.E.2d 1007 (Ill. App. C. 1983); Lurz
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ever, while Washington courts apparently are willing to allow a va-
riety of professionals to take advantage of the distinction,18 7 Illi-
nois courts seem to limit the implied exemption for the
noncommercial activities of members of the learned professions to
those professions which are subject to stringent policing by regula-
tory boards."8 Several decisions by other state courts, while not
elaborating on the delineation per se, have suggested that the ren-
dition of some professional services may be impliedly exempt from
the otherwise applicable state deceptive trade practices act.1"9
On the other hand, some state courts are not as conservative
with respect to the application of their state act. Texas courts seem
more than willing to apply their state deceptive trade practices
act 140 to a variety of professional activities. 4 1 In DeBakey v.
v. Panek, 527 N.E.2d 663 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Pucci v. Santi, 711 F. Supp. 916
(N.D. I1. 1989).
137. See Haberman v. Public Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032 (Wash. 1987)
(accountants, investment advisors, and engineers).
138. See Lyne v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 772 F. Supp. 1064 (N.D. I1. 1991).
The federal district court in Lyne held that the act applied to audit services ren-
dered by an accounting firm in conjunction with a securities offering. Id. at 1068.
In distinguishing the line of cases which exempted the actual practice of law from
the definition of commerce, the court emphasized that the accounting profession
was not subject to the same type of policing as attorneys. Id. See also Guess v.
Brophy, 517 N.E.2d 693 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (legal profession is subject to a polic-
ing more stringent than that to which purveyors of most commercial services are
subject), cert. denied, 526 N.E.2d 830 (1988).
139. See, e.g., Keyser v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 191 (D. Idaho
1987) (professional malpractice statute which requires proof of negligence bars
application of consumer protection statute to physician); Gatten v. Merzi, 579
A.2d 974 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (deceptive trade practices act intended to prohibit
unlawful practices associated with business enterprises but not to physicians ren-
dering medical services). Other courts in dicta have suggested such an implied
exemption. See, e.g., Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (al-
ternate holding that statute not designed to regulate the lawyer-client or account-
ant-client relationship); Neveroski v. Blair, 358 A.2d 473 (N.J. Super Ct. App.
Div. 1976) (professionals such as lawyers, physicians, dentists, accountants and
engineers engaged in activities beyond the pale of the act). See generally Sharon
Bossmeyer, Note, Reexamining New Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act: Loopholes for
Professionals? 7 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 45 (1983).
140. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 - 17.63 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993).
141. See generally John Robert Forshey, Comment, Applicability of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act to Attorneys, 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 65 (1978);
WILLIAM DEAN LEIKAM & LYNDA KAY CORBIN, Woods v. Littleton: Consumerism
Comes of Age, 18 S. TEx. L. J. 477 (1977); Patricia Swanson, Comment, The Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act: Application to Profes-
sional Malpractice, 8 ST. MARY'S L. J. 763, (1977); Donald F. Hawbaker, Coin-
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Staggs142 a Texas appellate court held that the act applied to the
purchase or acquisition of legal services. 4 s In that case the defend-
ant's attorney failed to timely obtain a name change, and in so
failing, allegedly took advantage of his client's lack of knowledge to
a grossly unfair degree. 14 In evaluating the statute's definitions of
services and consumer, 45 the court concluded that an attorney
does in fact sell legal services to a client, who as a consumer,
purchases them.14 The court opined that the legislature must have
intended legal services to be covered, since only physicians and
health care providers were exempted from the Texas act, wherein a
claim was based upon negligence. 147 The Texas act has also been
applied to other professionals, such as financial brokers, 148 ac-
countants,'14 9 and architects. 150 While the Texas act provides that a
failure to comply with an express or implied warranty can be ac-
tionable, 5 " it is unsettled whether or not a professional impliedly
warrants that professional services will be performed in a good and
workmanlike manner.15 2 If so, the potential for professional liabil-
ment, Specialization: The Resulting Standard of Care and Duty to Consult, 30
BAYLOR L. Rzv. 729 (1978); Steven K. Ward, Legal Malpractice in Texas, 19 S.
Tax. L. J. 587 (1978); Hale, supra note 75.
142. 605 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), writ refused, no reversible error,
612 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1981).
143. Id. at 633.
144. Id. at 632.
145. Tax. Bus. & COM. CoDE ANN. §17.45 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993).
146. DeBakey v. Staggs, 605 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
147. Id. See also Lucas v. Nesbitt, 653 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983)
(attorney's conduct of billing a client approximately four times the amount to
which he had testified under oath was owed could be a violation of the act); Bar-
nard v. Mecom, 650 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (attorney's failure to either
release trust funds or pursue lawsuit violated the act); Wright v. Lewis, 777
S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (failure to disclose offer of plea bargain could be
a deceptive act if attorney had knowledge of offer); Parker v. Carnahan, 772
S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (attorney's services covered by the act).
148. E. F. Hutton & Co. v Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. 1987), aff'g in
part 708 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
149. Dominquez v. Brackey Enter., Inc., 756 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988).
150. White Budd Van Ness Partnership v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint Ven-
ture, 798 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
151. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE § 17.50(A)(2) (WEST 1987 & Suwp. 1993).
152. See, e.g., Melody Homes Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987)
(issue of whether implied warranty extends to professional services of repairman
reserved); Archibald v. Act III Arabians, 755 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. 1988) (improper
horse training can be breach of implied warranty of good and workmanlike per-
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ity under the Texas act will be significant. 15
Massachusetts courts seem willing to apply their act to profes-
sional services as well. Although the supreme judicial court has ap-
plied the Massachusetts act only to the commercial activities of
professionals, 1 4 other courts seem willing to apply it to noncom-
mercial activities. 5 5 Should members of the learned professions be
exempt? Should only their noncommercial activities be exempt?
While this question has been presented in other states and an-
swered in differing ways by other courts and legislatures, the legis-
lature of North Carolina determined that the professional services
of a member of a learned profession should not be included in the
definition of commerce under the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act.156 How appropriate is this "bright" line?
NORTH CAROLINA'S EXEMPTION: POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR CHANGE
A. The Difficulty With The Definition
Who are these members of a learned profession? Although
originally the term embraced only physicians, attorneys and the
clergy, its dictionary meaning today embraces other occupational
endeavor characterized by attainments in special knowledge.157 For
example, the Supreme Court has held, "[E]ngineering is an impor-
formance); Dennis v. Allison, 698 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1985) (no need to imply war-
ranty because patient plaintiff had other remedies available). See generally Mark
L. Kincaid, Recognizing an Implied Warranty That "Professional" Services Will
Be Performed In a Good and Workmanlike Manner, 21 ST. MARY's L.J. 685
(1990).
153. See Hale, supra note 75, at 337-41. Of course, unlike the North Carolina
act, under the Texas act only the first $1,000.00 of actual damages are trebled
automatically. TEx. Bus. & Coh. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993).
154. Doucette v. Kwiat, 467 N.E. 2d 1374 (Mass. 1984) (charging fee to settle
government liens when settlement agreement included attorney fees constituted a
violation of the act); Guenard v. Burke, 443 N.E. 2d 892 (Mass. 1982) (no dam-
ages recoverable unless unfair or deceptive fee arrangement exceeded reasonable
value of services rendered); Brown v. Gerstein, 460 N.E.2d 1043 (Mass. App. Ct.
1984) (attorney's liability under Deceptive Trade Practices Act for false represen-
tations concerning bank's foreclosure sale of client's property were questions for
jury), appeal denied 464 N.E.2d 73 (Mass. 1984).
155. See, e.g., Levin v. Berley, 728 F.2d 551 (1st Cir. 1984) (executor stated
cause of action under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act for improperly drafted
will).
156. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
157. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1210 (6th ed. 1990).
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tant and learned profession. '1 8 A North Carolina Attorney gen-
eral's opinion, in an attempt to illuminate the meaning of this term
under the statutory exemption, endorsed the theoretical language
in Goldfarb which suggested that a distinguishing characteristic
was that the goal of professionals was to provide necessary services
to the community, and to that end, competition and enhancing
profit was not a goal. 159 The opinion also adopted the standard ad-
vanced in Commonwealth v. Brown,160 that a learned profession is
"characterized by the need of unusual learning, the existence of
confidential relations, and adherence to a standard of ethics higher
than that in the marketplace."16' The opinion concluded that the
phrase applied to physicians, attorneys, clergy, and related profes-
sions.116 In practice, though, how can one determine which occupa-.
tions are so related? Judges in other courts have noted that deter-
mining "who's in" and "who's out" is "a semantic adventure of
questionable value."1 3 Indeed, how can one determine how much
unusual learning must be learned before the profession is
"learned"?
Could this line be drawn based upon other criteria? Since reg-
ulation is an important characteristic of professional practices,6
perhaps those occupations which are regulated should be exempted
as being sufficiently related to a learned profession. Interpreting
the state's deceptive trade practices act, which exempted activities
otherwise regulated, the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Rous-
seau v. Eshleman,26 5 remarked in dicta that presumably physicians
would be exempt because they were subject to licensing and regu-
lation by a board of registration, and the same would be true of
electricians and plumbers.L66 If this is to be the bright line for what
158. National Soc. of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 681
(1978).
159. 47 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 118, 119 (1977).
160. 20 N.E.2d 478, 481 (Mass. 1939) (quoting McMurdo v. Getter, 10 N.E.2d
139 (Mass. 1937)) (dentistry is a learned profession).
161. 47 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 118, 119 (1977).
162. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
163. Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163, 166-67 (Wash. 1984) (quoting United
States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 389 F. Supp. 1193, 1198 (D.D.C.
Cir. 1974)). See also United States v. National Assoc. of Real Estate Boards, 339
U.S. 484, 496 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar As-
soc., 497 F.2d 1, 24 (4th Cir. 1974) (Craven, J., concurring and dissenting).
164. See supra notes 115-27 and accompanying text.
165. 519 A.2d 243 (N.H. 1986).
166. Id. at 245. Subsequent federal court decisions have suggested that the
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is learned and what is related, then under North Carolina law,
realtors, accountants, contractors, barbers, and pawnbrokers, along
with attorneys, medical practitioners, and a variety of other practi-
tioners167 should be exempt. Surely this delineation is inappropri-
ate and too all encompassing.
Perhaps it is the existence of confidential relationships which
should be emphasized instead, and the definition should encom-
pass all occupations in which a fiduciary duty is owed to the con-
sumers of the professional services. Certainly, members of the clas-
sic learned professions owe fiduciary duties to their clients,
patients and parishioners. However, in North Carolina, insurance
agents,6 8 auctioneers,' 6 realtors,17 0 and a variety of other profes-
exclusion was not meant to be interpreted applying to all trade or commerce, es-
pecially outside the context of attorneys and similar professionals. Therrien v.
Resource Financial Group, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 322, 328 (D.N.H. 1989). See also
WVG. v. Pacific Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 70, 72 (D.N.H. 1986) ("the issue is whether
a transaction 'is otherwise permitted', not whether an agency exists to review the
transaction").
167. Regulatory schemes exist for a variety of occupations under North Caro-
lina law. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-2 to 397 (1990 & Supp. 1992) (medicine
and allied occupations including dentistry, nursing, osteopathy, midwives, veteri-
narians, psychologists and podiatrists); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90B-1 to -14 (1991)
(social workers); N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90C-1 to -19 (1987) (therapeutic recreation
personnel); N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 91A-1 to -14 (1989) (pawnbrokers); N. C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 93-1 to -13 (1992) (public accountants); N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 93D-1 to
-16 (1991) (hearing aid dealers and fitters); N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 89E-1 to -24
(1991) (geologists); N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 89C-1 to -28 (1989) (engineering and land
surveyors); N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78C-1 to -81 (1990) (investment advisors); N. C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 83A-1 to -17 (1985) (architects); N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-1 to -38
(1985) (attorneys); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 85B-1 to -9 (1992) (auctioneers); N. C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 86A-1 to -26 (1985) (barbers); N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 87-1 to -64 (1989)
(contractors); N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 89A-1 to -8 (1991) (landscape architects); N. C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 88-1 to -30 (1990) (cosmetic artists); N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 88A-1 to
-23 (1990) (practitioners of electrolysis).
168. See, e.g., R-Anell Homes, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 62 N.C.
App. 653, 659, 303 S.E.2d 573, 577 (1983); Davidson v. Knauff Ins. Agency, 93
N.C. App. 20, 32, 376 S.E.2d 488, 495, disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 577, 381 S.E.2d
772 (1989); Kron Medical Corp. v. Collier Cobb & Assoc.,Inc., 107 N.C. App. 331,
240-41, 420 S.E.2d 192, 197, disc. rev. denied, 333 N.C. 168, 424 S.E.2d 910 (1992).
169. See, e.g., Spence v. Spaulding and Perkins, Ltd., 82 N.C. App. 665, 667,
347 S.E.2d 864, 865, (1986); Colvard v. Francis, 106 N.C. App. 277, 282, 416
S.E.2d 579, 582, disc. rev. denied, 332 N.C. 146, 419 S.E.2d 570 (1992).
170. See, e.g., Whitman v. Forbes, 55 N.C. App. 706, 713, 286 S.E.2d 889,
894, (1982); Kim v. Professional Business Brokers Ltd., 74 N.C. App. 48, 51-52,
328 S.E.2d 296, 299 (1985); Forbes v. Par Ten Group, Inc., 99 N.C. App. 587, 599,
394 S.E.2d 643, 650 (1990), disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C. 89, 402 S.E.2d 824 (1991).
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sionals owe fiduciary duties to the consumers of their services as
well. Are these professionals, then, learned? While it has been
stated that a real estate broker and client have a measure of trust
analogous to that of an attorney and client,"' state courts also rec-
ognize that a breach of a fiduciary duty, in and of itself, can consti-
tute a violation of the North Carolina Deceptive Trade Practices
Act. 171 Therefore, even though involvement in special relationships
of trust and confidence is one characteristic of the learned profes-
sions, a violation of that special trust, at times, can be a violation
of the Act. This inconsistency dims the bright line somewhat. Nev-
ertheless, if the determination eventually is made as to what pro-
fessions are learned, one further inquiry must still be made.
Assuming that one is a member of a learned profession, what
services are professional, and hence, exempt under the Act? The
same attorney general's opinion previously discussed17 3 also sug-
gested that professional services were those which were not by na-
ture commercial activities.7 4 The opinion, by way of example, inti-
mated that deceptive advertising by an attorney would violate the
Act, as would a conspiracy among attorneys to fix prices. 75 The
opinion concluded that such activities were not part of the actual
performance of professional services, but were instead, commercial
activities. 17 Apparently, then, the language used in the statutory
exemption is an attempt to codify the separation between the com-
mercial and noncommercial activities of a professional practice as
developed in other states by their judiciary.177 Assuming that this
distinction is a valid one, is it workable? Even justices who endorse
such a distinction admit that defining what is the actual practices
of a profession, such as law, is a difficult endeavor. 7 8 The practice
171. Starling v. Sproles, 66 N.C. App. 653, 656, 311 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1984).
172. See, e.g., Seafare Corp. v. Trenor Corp., 88 N.C. App. 404, 406-07, 363
S.E.2d 643, 647, writ denied, stay denied, 321 N.C. 745, 366 S.E.2d 871, disc. rev.
denied, 322 N.C. 113, 367 S.E.2d 917 (1988); Adams v. Moore, 96 N.C. App. 359,
361, 385 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1989), disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 46, 389 S.E.2d 83
(1990); Wilson v Wilson-Cook Medical, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 533, 542 (M.D.N.C.
1989), mandamus denied, 902 F.2d 1567 (4th Cir. 1990), aff'd on other grounds
942 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1991).
173. See supra notes 157-162 and accompanying text.
174. 47 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 119 (1977).
175. Id. at 120.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 127-139 and accompanying text.
178. Rousseau v. Eshleman, 519 A.2d 243, 250 (N.H. 1986) (Johnson, J. and
Batchelders, J., dissenting) ("Many courts have declined to formulate a single
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of law today differs dramatically from the era in which the learned
professions achieved their eminence. Today's complex society de-
fies making any distinction based upon what is a purely legal issue.
Many law firms utilize a multidisciplinary approach which involves
other "professionals" in addressing economic, scientific, financial,
and political questions, as well as those which are legal.17 9 Who
then among this group is learned, and when does their professional
practice become primarily commercial, and hence subject to decep-
tive trade practice legislation? This same problem of defining what
is commercial versus what is professional can arise in other alleg-
edly learned professional practices as well,
Given that the exemption for the professional services of a
member of a learned profession was codified over fifteen years ago,
judicial opinions should have established parameters for who is
learned and what services are professional. In Cameron v. New
Hanover Memorial Hospital,180 podiatrists sued a hospital and two
staff doctors for allegedly conspiratorial conduct in denying them
hospital privileges in violation of North Carolina's Deceptive
Trade Practices Act. The cause of action accrued before the 1977
amendment to the Act and the court refused to give the statutory
exemption retroactive effect.181 Nevertheless, in evaluating the
Penney court's narrow definition of trade and commerce under the
earlier version,182 along with the Uniform Commercial Code's defi-
nition of seller, and the Commonwealth v. Brown court's definition
of learned professions,188 the appellate court concluded that the
Act did not apply to the activities in question.1 8 4 In dicta the court
noted that the same result would be reached if the case were de-
cided instead, under the current statutory exemption.188
definition, using only the 'wilderness of single instances' as guides in determining
what constitutes the practice of law.").
179. See generally James W. Jones, The Challenge of Change: The Practice
of law in the Year 2000, 41 VAND. L. REv. 683 (1988).
180. 58 N.C. App. 414, 293 S.E.2d 901, disc. rev. denied and appeal dis-
missed, 307 N.C. 127, 297 S.E.2d 399 (1982).
181. Id. at 443, 293 S.E.2d at 919.
182. See supra n6tes 16-17 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
184. Cameron, 58 N.C. App. at 444-46, 293 S.E.2d at 919-920.
185. Id. at 446, 293 S.E.2d at 920. In a subsequent federal case, Cohn v.
Wilkes General Hosp., 767 F. Supp. 111 (W.D.N.C. 1991), a chiropractor brought
a similar suit under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act for wrongful denial of
medical privileges. Although the claim was dismissed for want of pendent jurisdic-
tion, the court opined in dicta that, based upon Cameron, the act would not ap-
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Since Cameron, there has been only one case which has ad-
dressed the extent of the exemption directly. In Abram v. Charter
Medical Corporation of Raleigh""6 the plaintiff alleged that the ac-
tions of the defendant in seeking an extensive review of the plain-
tiffs application for a certificate of need violated the Act.187 The
defendant in turn argued that the Act exempted services rendered
by a member of a learned profession, and that it was exempt as a
professional health care provider.188 The appellate court concluded
that since an applicant seeking a certificate of need was required to
meet certain criteria, a request by another facility that the applica-
tion be subject to scrutiny did not give rise to a claim, given that
the legislature intended to exclude professional services from the
Act.1 89 However, it defies reality to suggest, for the purposes of rul-
ing on a motion to dismiss, that challenges to the admission of a
potential competitor into the community of health care providers
can be motivated solely by professional considerations, and not
those of an economic nature.
Other cases have addressed the issue of who and what is ex-
empt from the Act indirectly by not raising the question of
whether or not the exemption applies. While realtors owe fiduciary
duties to their clients and are regulated and licensed under state
law, the Act undoubtedly applies to them.190 Therefore, realtors
ply. Id. at 114.
186. 100 N.C. App. 718, 398 S.E.2d 331 (1990), disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C.
328, 402 S.E.2d 828 (1991).
187. Id. at 722, 398 S.E.2d at 333. A "certificate of need" is a prerequisite to
obtaining permission from the North Carolina Department of Human Resources
to build a health service facility. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 722-23, 398 S.E.2d at 334.
190. See, e.g., Whitman v. Forbes, 55 N.C. App. 706, 286 S.E.2d 889 (1992)
(broker's fraudulent purchase of house at inadequate price); Starling v. Sproles,
66 N.C. App. 653, 311 S.E.2d 688 (1984) (brokers violated the act by failing to
disclose offer from third party prior to purchasing the property); Powell v. Wold,
88 N.C. App. 61, 362 S.E.2d 796 (1987) (realtor's alleged failure to disclose plan
for major thoroughfare extension was sufficient to state cause of action); Robert-
son v. Boyd, 88 N.C. App. 437, 363 S.E.2d 672 (1988) (cause of action stated based
upon broker's alleged concealment of termite infestation); Forbes v. Par Ten
Group, Inc., 99 N.C. App. 587, 394 S.E.2d 643 (1990) (summary judgment for de-
fendants improper where allegations established misapplication of deposits from
sale of property), disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C. 89, 402 S.E.2d 824 (1991); Johnson v.
Beverly-Hanks & Assoc., 328 N.C. 202, 400 S.E.2d 38 (1991) (summary judgment
for defendants improper where allegations could establish fraud by realtors), rev'g
in part, aff'g in part and remanding 97 N.C. App. 335, 388 S.E.2d 584 (1990).
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must not be considered members of a learned profession, since typ-
ically the conduct which forms the basis of the complaint involves
either a deceptive rendition of their services or an unfair abuse of
their fiduciary responsibilities.1 91
The issue of whether accountants in North Carolina are con-
sidered members of a learned profession is unanswered. In Jen-
nings v. Lindsey,1 1 2 the plaintiffs and their accountants embarked
upon a joint enterprise which subsequently soured. Plaintiffs sued,
alleging inter alia that the accountants had committed unfair and
deceptive trade practices in violation of the Act. 93 The issue of
whether or not the accountants were exempt was not addressed.
The appellate court held only that the claim was improperly dis-
missed by the trial court since the four year statute of limitations
applied to that specific count. 94 Perhaps accountants are members
of a learned profession, but the joint venture in Jennings exceeded
the scope of their professional services. 9 5
The fact that attorneys are unquestionably members of a
learned profession makes two other cases more difficult to rational-
ize. In Concrete Service Corporation v. Investors Group Incorpo-
rated,96 the defendant attorney was held to have engaged in unfair
or deceptive acts. 97 The attorney formed a corporation with his
father-in-law and, in the course of business, fraudulently induced
suppliers to extend credit to the firm based upon letters written by
the attorney on legal stationary, financial statements supplied by
the attorney, and an overall appearance created by the attorney
suggesting that the enterprise was creditworthy and backed by the
security of an attorney's trust account.19 8 Even though such prac-
tices seem inextricably intertwined with the actual practice of law,
the applicability of the exemption was not addressed.
Likewise, in Investors Title Insurance Company v. Herzig,'9"
191. See supra note 190.
192. 69 N.C. App. 710, 318 S.E.2d 318 (1984).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 717, 318 S.E.2d at 322.
195. Even if the activities were considered commercial in nature and exempt,
the case itself notes that the business relationship developed because of the pro-
fessional relationship. When does professional end and commercial begin?
196. 79 N.C. App. 678, 340 S.E.2d 755, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 333, 346 S.E.2d
137 (1986).
197. Id. at 686-87, 340 S.E.2d at 761.
198. Id.
199. 101 N.C. App. 127, 398 S.E.2d 659 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 330
N.C. 681, 413 S.E.2d 268 (1992). The liability of the attorney's firm under agency
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an attorney was found to have engaged in unfair and deceptive
acts arising from fraudulently certifying a title insurance applica-
tion for the purposes of obtaining a personal loan. Although the
transaction in Herzig was quite complicated, the false certification
of title was at the core of the conspiracy and seems to be indispu-
tably a rendition of legal services. In both cases, the courts must
have been distinguishing the nature of the legal services rendered
based upon the fact that a third party brought suit, and not the
attorney's client. 00 Whether or not the Act dictates that particular
application of the exemption does not seem apparent from either
the wording of the Act or the opinions in the cases.
B. The Wisdom Of The Exemption
That the bright line seems anything but bright is not as troub-
lesome a situation as the issue of whether or not professional ser-
vices rendered by members of a learned profession should be ex-
empt from the Act in the first place. One of the purposes of the
Act is to maintain ethical standards in business dealings.20 1 Why
then should professionals, who are to be held to the highest ethical
standards, be exempt? It would be comforting to conclude that
members of learned professions should be exempt precisely be-
cause of their adherence to a standard of ethics higher than that of
the marketplace, but were that uniformly the case, professional
disciplinary systems would serve no purpose and conduct no
business.
A second purpose of the Act is to provide an effective cause of
action for aggrieved consumers.02 Why should consumers of pro-
fessional services be barred from this additional remedial measure?
law also was addressed. Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 320 N.C. 770, 360
S.E.2d 786 (1987).
200. See also Harris v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of North Carolina, 85 N.C. App.
669, 355 S.E.2d 838, (1987). In Harris defendant's attorney sent an allegedly de-
famatory letter to the employer of the plaintiff. In upholding the trial court's dis-
missal of the complaint, the appellate court did not address whether or not the
communication was exempt as being a professional service, but concluded as a
matter of law that the communication was neither unfair nor deceptive given the
strong public policy favoring freedom of communication between parties and their
attorneys with respect to anticipated or pending litigation. Id. at 677, 355 S.E.2d
at 844.
201. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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Is it because there are other avenues for redress available, 20 3 such
as professional malpractice suits and disciplinary sanctions? Ar-
guably those avenues are often "ineffective for aggrieved consum-
ers" because malpractice claims are difficult to prove,0 4 and disci-
plinary sanctions provide no remedies directly to the consumer.2 05
Moreover, the statutory remedies of attorney fees and treble dam-
ages would be unavailable if other grounds were pursued.06
Perhaps it is because professional practices are heavily regu-
lated that there is no need to submit practitioners to the possibil-
ity of dual penalties. 207 This argument has been accepted by North
Carolina courts with respect to securities transactions.2 0 8 However,
such transactions are subject to pervasive federal regulation. 09 In
203. This argument is not particularly persuasive because in other deceptive
trade practices cases there are usually other causes of action available as well. See
supra note 69 and accompanying text.
204. See generally Craig C. Beles & Daniel Win. Wyckoff, The Washington
Consumer Protection Act v. The Learned Professional, 10 GONZ. L. REv. 435
(1975).
205. Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 461 A.2d 938,
945 (Conn. 1983). See also Mason, supra note 91, at 553-54.
206. Parties injured by attorneys who commit fraudulent practices may only
recover double damages. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 84-13 (1985).
207. See Saraceni, supra note 80, at 1748 n. 93. See also Bossmeyer, supra
note 139. On the other hand, the fact that an occupation is licensed does not
mean it is licensed to use unfair and deceptive practices. Rousseau v. Eshleman,
529 A.2d 862, 864 (N.H. 1987) (argument of plaintiff on motion for
reconsideration).
208. Skinner v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 333 S.E.2d 236 (1985);
Linder v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1985); City Nat'l
Bank v. American Commonwealth Fin. Corp., 801 F.2d 714 (4th Cir. 1986) cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987); Accord Ellis v. Northern Star Co., 326 N.C. 219, 388
S.E.2d 127, reh. denied, 326 N.C. 488, 392 S.E.2d 89 (1990); McPhail v. Wilson,
733 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D.N.C. 1990).
209. The question may be one of federal preemption, not whether or not dual
state regulatory schemes can coexist. Other states, possibly because of the exis-
tence of pervasive federal regulation, do -not subject securities transactions to
their deceptive trade practice legislation. See e.g., Robertson v. White, 633 F.
Supp. 954 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (act removes transactions governed by State Commis-
sioner of Securities); Stephenson v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 839
F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1988) (Louisiana act inapplicable to securities fraud cases),
reh'g denied, 849 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988); Mer-
cer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt & Heuer, P.C. 713 F.Supp. 1019 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (sale
of securities not regulated by Michigan act); State ex rel. McLeod v. Rhoades, 267
S.E.2d 539 (S.C. 1980) (allegedly deceptive practices in public offering not subject
to South Carolina Act); Kittilson v. Ford, 595 P.2d 944 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (act
not applicable since alleged misrepresentations were regulated by securities law);
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contrast, insurance, like professional licensing, is traditionally reg-
ulated by the states. North Carolina permits unfair and deceptive
insurance practices to be subject to regulation under a separate
statutory regime for insurance,"'0 as well as under the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act.211 That practitioners of professions are ex-
empt from such dual regulation may even raise constitutional
questions."1 '
Some jurists fear that the application of deceptive trade prac-
tices acts to members of learned professions would undermine the
performance of their duties, since their roles often require them to
exercise professional judgment. s These acts, however, allow liabil-
ity to attach even with respect to negligent omissions or errors in
judgment, while disallowing any defenses to negligence. 14 How-
ever, the North Carolina Act does not create strict liability21 5 nor
liability for any implied warranty of professional services.1 6 Some
Cabot v. Baddour, 477 N.E.2d 399 (Mass. 1985) (act should not be extended to
securities given federal regulation); Nichols v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 706 F. Supp. 1309 (M.D. Tenn. 1989) (federal preeminence in field of se-
curities precludes application of state consumer act to such transactions).
210. N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 58-63-1 to -60 (1991). The regulatory scheme creates
no private right of action.
211. See, e.g., Ellis v. Sm!th-Broadhurst, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 180, 268 S.E.2d
271 (1980); Phillips v. Integon Corp., 70 N.C. App. 440, 319 S.E.2d 673 (1984);
Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 343 S.E.2d 174 (1986);
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1320
(E.D.N.C. 1990); Kron Medical Corp. v. Collier Cobb & Assoc., 107 N.C. App. 331,
420 S.E.2d 192, disc. rev. denied, 333 N. C. 168, 424 S.E.2d 910 (1992). The De-
ceptive Trade Practices Act is allowed to coexist with other regulatory schemes as
well. See Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985)
(statutes regulating personnel agencies as enforced by the Commissioner of La-
bor); Tomlinson v. Camel City Motors, Inc., 330 N.C. 76, 408 S.E.2d 853, aff'g in
part and rev'g in part, 101 N.C. App. 419, 399 S.E.2d 147 (1991) (regulation of
motor vehicle dealers). See also Christina L. Goshaw, Note, Tomlinson v. Camel
City Motors, Inc.: The North Carolina Supreme Court's Hybrid Solution to
Surety Liability Under General Statutes Section 75-16, 70 N.C. REv. 1959
(1992).
212. Mason, supra note 91, at 554.
213. Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163, 172 (Wash. 1984) (Dimmick, J., and
Cunningham, J., concurring); Rousseau v. Eshleman, 519 A.2d 243, 249 (N. H.
1986) (Johnson, J., and Batchelders, J., dissenting); Gatten v. Merzi, 579 A.2d
974, 975 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
214. Hale, supra note 75, at 343.
215. See also Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1983)
(language of Minnesota statute connotes some degree of culpability).
216. See supra notes 34, 151-53 and accompanying text.
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degree of wrongful conduct must be established. Moreover, merely
because a violation of the Act is claimed does not mean that liabil-
ity is automatic. A violation is a question of law: "Courts have the
capacity to recognize an unfair or deceptive practice when they see
one."" This check should help to alleviate fears that the Act will
be applied indiscriminately to professional activities.
Furthermore, there are numerous blatantly unfair acts and de-
ceptive practices which can be committed by professionals which
fall nowhere near a borderline culpability situation. Attorneys can
settle claims without their client's consent, commingle the funds of
clients with their own, and knowingly and willfully neglect the le-
gal affairs of their clients, while falsely representing that the claim
is being pursued. Psychiatrists can engage in sexual relations with
patients knowing that such conduct violates ethical standards 18
and lessens the patients's chances for recovery. 19 What of Jim
Bakker and Heritage U.S.A.? Should the query be whether or not
such acts are commercial or professional? Or should the appropri-
ate inquiry be whether or not such practices of are unfair or decep-
tive, notwithstanding the nature of the services or the historical
roots of the practitioner's occupation?
North Carolina courts recognize that an inequitable assertion
of power or position can constitute an unfair trade practice.220 Yet
the legislature expressly exempted those individuals who stand in
the strongest position of being able to abuse their position of
trust. -21 Ironically, the standard bearer of the definition of learned
217. Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary Bros. Realty, 79 N.C. App. 51, 59, 338 S.E.2d
918, 923, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 378, 342 S.E.2d 896 (1986).
218. See generally William L. Webb, The Doctor-Patient Covenant and the
Threat of Exploitation, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1149 (Sept. 1986) (editorial); Jer-
emy A. Lazarus, Sex With Former Patients Almost Always Unethical, 149 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 855 (July 1992) (editorial).
219. See generally Nanette Gartrell et. al., Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual Con-
tact: Results of a National Survey, I: Prevalence, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1126
(Sept. 1986).
220. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Adams v. Moore, 96 N.C. App. 359, 385 S.E.2d 799 (1989), disc.
rev. denied, 326 N.C. 46, 389 S.E.2d 83 (1990). In Adams a woman's pastor un-
justly enriched himself in the purchase of her home. The court correctly held that
such an abuse of confidence stated a claim under the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act. Id. An inquiry as to whether or not, as a member of the learned professions,
he was rendering professional services was not, and should not, have been
addressed.
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professions, Commonwealth v. Brown,22 2 involved the constitution-
ality of a state statute, which penalized the advertisement of pro-
fessional services.223 In upholding the statute the court justified the
legislature's prohibition, noting that "thousands if not millions of
citizens might receive inferior service in the belief, induced by
skillful advertising that it was superior. . . [T]he Legislature, tak-
ing the view which has been expressed, might conclude that the
regulations made were necessary for the protection of public inter-
est.' 22 4 Of course today that view is no longer viable with respect
to the advertising of professional services. 5 Perhaps today the
blanket exemption for professional services rendered by members
of the learned professions is no longer viable either.
CONCLUSION
In the true spirit of public service, members of the learned
professions should lobby for inclusion in the Act's coverage. It is
now time to take one more step away from the archaic distinction
enjoyed by members of the learned professions, a step which has
already been taken in some states. That step could be the drastic
one of obliterating the exemption. However, given the automatic
treble damages provision of the Act, which does not require a
showing of bad faith, such a step might be too large, notwithstand-
ing that the judiciary has the sole discretion to determine what
conduct constitutes a violation. A more palatable step might be to
disembark from the semantic adventure of trying to ascertain who
is learned and what is a professional service, in favor of an exemp-
tion which excepts damages caused by the negligent rendition of
services performed by specifically enumerated professionals, par-
ticularly if privity exists. Arguably that was the original purpose
behind a very ambiguous, and arguably unjustifiable exclusion. In
this way the legislature can determine and provide notice as to ex-
actly who is to be exempt. For those individuals the important in-
quiry then will be whether or not their conduct was unfair or de-
222. 20 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1939).
223. Id. at 479.
224. Id. at 481.
225. For a historical perspective on attorney advertising see James R. Devine,
Lawyer Advertising and the Kutak Commission: A Refreshing Return to the
Past, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 503 (1982).
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ceptive, as opposed to negligent. Such a revision would serve to
further the purposes of the Act and the public interest to which
members of the learned professions are dedicated.
40
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss3/1
